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Introduction 
A Cartography of Contemporary Cognitive Social Theory1
 
 
Piet Strydom 
University College Cork 
 
 
The context of social theory has undergone a significant change in the late twentieth 
century. While conditioned by a wide variety of factors, a major intellectual impetus 
behind this change was the so-called ‘cognitive revolution’ of the late 1950s and the 
subsequent rise and development of the cognitive sciences (e.g. Gardner 1989; Varela et 
al. 1991; Bechtel and Graham 1998; Strydom 2006a). What gave this event added social 
theoretical relevance is that it effectively led to a reopening of the question of the 
constitution of social reality and the manner in which it should be studied. The resulting 
debate problematised such processes as information processing, knowledge production 
and utilization, communication and world creation and their modes of structuration as 
well as existing epistemological and methodological approaches. For three or four 
decades now, this re-contextualization has been presenting social theory with a range of 
new problems, challenges and possibilities. This continues to be the case. The 
controversy about the philosophical and social scientific significance of naturalism 
revitalised by the cognitive sciences, brain research in particular, is attracting increasing 
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attention. In this context, Stephen Turner for example provocatively submits that, today, 
‘cognitive science’…[constitutes]…‘the central challenge for social theory’ (2002: 1). 
 
One way in which this challenge is making itself felt is through the demand for a 
thorough revision of some core social scientific concepts and approaches, including their 
underlying assumptions. It is the case, of course, that since cognitive science is 
programmatic, contested and evolving, this demand is by no means straightforward and 
clear-cut. Despite this, and although not yet sufficiently attending to the contemporary 
interdisciplinary debate about cognition, social scientists have begun rising to the 
challenge. Indeed, it would not be an exaggeration to say that a cognitive movement has 
emerged in social theory and, consequently, that the field has been enjoying a remarkable 
growth during the past decade or two. But given the complex circumstances, it is not 
surprising that reactions to and interpretations of the challenge vary rather widely and in 
certain respects also reproduce old differences in a new form. Some defensively reject 
cognitive science as irrelevant or, considering its naturalistic thrust, as a dangerous threat. 
Others have become more reflective and analytical in dealing with conceptual and 
theoretical questions, but have not necessarily yet come to grips with the complexities 
and nuances of the problem. Still others, quite willing to face epistemological difficulties, 
insist on pursuing such serious questions as to whether cognitive science refracts the 
social scientific problematic, implies a refinement or renovation of methodology, and 
advances the analysis of social reality. Even in the latter case, responses differ sharply. 
Some stress a scientistic naturalism, others an idealistic culturalism or rationalistic 
individualism, and still others an appropriate way to relate the sociocultural world to 
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natural processes. The variety of directions in which answers to the pressing questions are 
being sought, rather than simply the different reactions, is the source of an opaque 
situation which points to the urgent need for making sense of contemporary cognitive 
social theory. 
 
The purpose of this special issue of EJST, accordingly, is to bring together a selection of 
contributions by leading authors representing distinct European and American traditions 
which, when placed side-by-side, would give the reader a sense of the cognitive 
movement in social theory as well as an authoritative and unique overview of different 
yet complementary directions at the outset of the twenty-first century. In order to present 
these contributions in an intelligible way, however, it would be necessary to identify 
criteria and develop a framework according to which the different positions could be 
related to one another. Since no such construct is as yet available, this introduction will 
be devoted to a first attempt at a systematic mapping of the field of contemporary 
cognitive social theory. To begin with, a few clarifying historical remarks are made about 
the relation of social theory to cognitive science, then some relevant criteria for the 
classification of different types of cognitive social theory are reviewed and, finally, a 
tentative framework is proposed. Since it is not my task as editor to review each of the 
unique contributions in detail but rather to maintain a meta-perspective, I shall make 
references to the eight essays in the course of the discussion with a view to locating them 
in such a way within the framework that it is possible to obtain an overview of the 
contemporary cognitive social theoretical field. 
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Cognitive Science and Social Theory 
Whereas the cognitive revolution’s impact on the social sciences was more indirect than 
on disciplines like psychology and linguistics, anthropology was nevertheless earlier and 
more directly affected than sociology. Given the paradigm shift from behaviour to 
cognition, this can be accounted for by the fact that anthropology to a degree shared a 
behaviouristic orientation with psychology and linguistics. By contrast, sociology has a 
long tradition of studying ideas, beliefs, convictions, motivations, categories and 
knowledge. This concern allowed it not only to anticipate – albeit somewhat obliquely – 
the cognitive revolution in certain respects, as for instance did Weber, Simmel, 
Durkheim, Mannheim, Mead, Schutz and Adorno, but also to latch to a certain extent 
quite seamlessly – albeit not very explicitly – onto it. This latter relation is encapsulated 
by the so-called ‘cognitive turn [in] sociology’ (Knorr-Cetina and Cicourel 1981: 2; 
Fuller 1984) which occurred during the late 1960s and 70s borne by theorists like Berger 
and Luckmann (1967), Garfinkel (1967), Habermas (1971, 1972), Luhmann (1973), 
Cicourel (1973), Nowotny (1973), Goffman (1974), Bourdieu (1977) and Knorr (1977) – 
all of whom were able to open new cognitive perspectives while drawing on such long-
standing traditions as Durkheimianism, hermeneutics, phenomenology, pragmatism, 
symbolic interactionism, critical theory, the sociology of knowledge and so forth. 
 
This initial wave of social theoretical responses to the cognitive revolution proceeded 
under the auspices of a serial symbolic processing model (e.g. Newell 1980) which, 
although basically inspired by the leading technological innovation of the time, the 
computer, allowed competing and even contrary interpretations of information 
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processing, knowledge and communication. The contradictory cognitive science 
directions impacting on the social sciences – particularly cognitive psychology,2 artificial 
intelligence3 and linguistics4 – left their mark on cognitive social theory. Evidence for 
this is to be found in both contrary positions taken by different theorists and in tensions 
within the writings of individual theorists.5
 
The second set of social theoretical responses to cognitive science took shape in the 
context of a deepening and broadening from approximately 1980 onwards of the original 
quite narrow cognitivism based on the computer model. From linear symbolic processing 
and syntactically structured representation, a first vertical shift took place in the direction 
of the brain neuroscientifically conceived as an operationally closed, multilayered, neural 
network in which different components performing complementary sub-tasks bring about 
changes through experience. The potential that the brain model opened for social theory, 
particularly by way of so-called ‘parallel distributed processing’ or ‘connectionism’ 
(Rumelhart et al. 1986), was multiplied by the second horizontal shift. It entailed the 
expansion of the original model to include the environment. Now it was no longer simply 
a matter of networks, the generation of emergent properties and their self-organization 
(e.g. Krohn, Küppers and Nowotny 1990) – i.e., something about which social theory 
could learn from cognitive science – but also of embodiment, situatedness, historicity, 
engagement, activity and dynamism (e.g. Varela et al. 1991) – something about which 
social theory in turn could teach cognitive science. While the addition of the brain and 
environment models threw cognitive science into an identity crisis (Bechtel and Graham 
1998: 77), the insecurity of this pluralism has in turn introduced a productive tension into 
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social theory. With the different models stimulating the development and consolidation of 
divergent directions, an invigorating impulse fed directly into a remarkable efflorescence 
of cognitive social theory during the 1980s and 90s. This was reinforced by the impact of 
contextual factors among which are, for example, the invasion of more and more domains 
by culture; the establishment of neo-liberal economics and politics and the resulting 
globalisation; the ascendancy of the life sciences; the spectre of risk and the increasing 
importance of ecology; the flaring up of debates about environmental problems and new 
technologies; and more recently the confrontation between science and religion and 
between different religions. 
 
Despite the fact that critics appeared all along the way,6 their varied objections did not 
succeed in impeding the cognitive movement. The reasons for this are manifold, but two 
stand out in particular. First, the cognitive turn’s exposure of the major sociological 
traditions as having in one way or other confounded different dimensions of social reality 
demands that new distinctions be made and new relations be established. To dissipate 
confusion, we need to determine anew the relations among, for instance, the collective, 
the practical and the cognitive (Thévenot 1998); among collective representations, 
beliefs, judgements and acceptance (Miller 1986, 1992; Engel 1997; Bouvier in this 
issue); and, more basically, between the cognitive and the symbolic. If we do this, a 
whole series of more precise questions arises: What is the relation between society and 
nature or, more specifically, between the sociocultural world and the brain (Habermas 
2005: 155-86; Bergesen 2004)? What is the relation between collective phenomena and 
the individual whose mind is the product of a unique and distinctive learning history 
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(Turner 2002)? How do actors relate to culture, or how does culture enter into action 
(DiMaggio 1997; Cerulo 2002; Lamont and Thévenot 2000)? Are symbols the sole 
infrastructure of meaning? What role do they play if experience is not simply 
symbolically structured but also organized by active schemata? What is the relation 
between symbolic analysis and cognitive analysis (D’Andrade 1995; Eder 1993, 1996, in 
this issue; Conein 2005; Brekhus in this issue)? And so forth. 
 
The second reason for the strengthening of the cognitive approach during the past decade 
or so concerns a more contextual force – viz. the increasingly visible vulnerability of 
modern societies and, hence, the mounting uncertainty about macro-processes and their 
outcomes in the wake of rapid and pervasive societal transformation. Not only the array 
of risks produced by a civilisation of self-injury and potential self-destruction (Beck 
1999) became apparent, but also the urgent need globally and in an enlarging Europe for 
a ‘politics of mentalities’ (Lepenies 1997: 37; see also Delanty and Rumford 2005) and a 
new mode of coordination articulated in the medium of intercultural communication. 
Such vulnerability, uncertainty and lack of coordination compelled social scientists to 
take a more penetrating look at processes and structures and to de- and reconstruct 
macro-phenomena. This required more focused attention being given to modes of 
perception, modes of schematisation or framing, processes of the construction of 
cognitive structures of different levels and scope, and the discursive processing of 
cultural models of reality. 
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Given the impetus social theory received from the cognitive revolution and interaction 
with the cognitive sciences, the cognitive social theoretical field is today quite extensive, 
embracing a wide range of competing yet complementary directions. It is for the purpose 
of gaining a better understanding of this field that it is now necessary to collect some 
criteria and to take the first steps toward developing a tentative classification of types of 
contemporary cognitive social theory. 
 
Mapping the Cognitive Social Theoretical Field 
Due to the ongoing development of cognitive social theory since the 1980s, attempts to 
map the field are few and far between and, perhaps, even premature to this day.7 Criteria 
for distinguishing different types are certainly emerging from the debates, even if only 
hesitantly so, but no systematic classification is ready to hand as yet. Whatever proposals 
are available, including the interesting ones of Borzeix et al., DiMaggio and Cerulo, are 
more or less limited because of their use of content oriented criteria and/or neglect to 
extrapolate the epistemological-methodological dimension. The epistemologically 
oriented Sorbonne conference held in 1995 (Boudon et al. 1997) delivered valuable ideas 
to which I shall return below, but having been intentionally confined to questions 
regarding the role of rational choice theory, methodological individualism and naturalism 
in the study of collective beliefs and action, it was not concerned with providing an 
overview of the larger field. To get a sense of the task before us, it will be helpful first to 
consider briefly the available proposals. Whatever their limitations, they provide stepping 
stones toward a more comprehensive and thoroughgoing way of mapping the field. 
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Proposals for Mapping the Field 
 
Borzeix et al. 
With its conference in the autumn of 1995 and the resulting anthology (Borzeix et al. 
1998), the Société française de sociologie envisaged bringing to attention the different 
cognitive currents represented in the Francophone sociological community. While 
various criteria for a possible classification of cognitive social theory are contained in the 
contributions, Borzeix et al. opted for a content-oriented, thematic approach without 
pretending to be comprehensive or legislative. This organizing instrument embraces four 
fundamental themes: the theory of ideology and of error, the sociology of categories and 
cognitive semantics, cognition and action, and finally argumentation and the diffusion of 
representations. While being a meaningful step towards a systematisation of the field, 
deeper meta-theoretical dimensions are not elevated to the more general level. 
 
DiMaggio 
DiMaggio (2002: 275-81) classifies different types within the ‘space of cognitive 
sociology’ which he establishes by means of two axes. The first object-oriented 
continuum stretches from works on how we think (‘focus on styles and mechanisms of 
cognition’) to those concerned with the substance of thought (‘focus on content of 
cognition’). The second methodologically oriented axis pertains to the strategy followed 
in articulating cognitive sociology and has works conceiving it as ‘autochthonous’ at its 
one extreme, which contrasts with works regarding cognitive sociology as ‘building on 
cognitive psychology,’ at the other. This allows DiMaggio to order a small number of 
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contributions, with the exception of Durkheim all American, in a meaningful way. This 
typology is constructed from the point of view of his own preference for a cultural 
sociology informed by cognitive psychology, which he justifies with the argument that 
interpretative approaches must be brought into relation with research on cognitive 
structures and processes (DiMaggio 1997). Although DiMaggio’s typology is not 
conceived as an attempt at a general classification, this epistemological-methodological 
gesture is an important one. The crucial issue, however, is the particular use we should 
make of cognitive psychology or, more generally, of cognitive science. The question is 
whether and, if so, to what extent  DiMaggio’s typology could accommodate authors 
such as Turner (2002; in this issue), Sperber (1996, 1997), Luhmann (1995) or Conein 
(1990, 2005). 
 
Cerulo 
In line with DiMaggio’s advocacy, Cerulo (2002: 283-93; 2005) takes cognitive 
psychology as her guideline while drawing cues from the shift to the brain model. 
Important to her is the categorisation of the process of cognition which she understands 
as thought unfolding through a series of natural operational stages. Despite stressing the 
need to avoid cognitive science’s tendency to celebrate psychological invariants in favour 
of focusing on cognition in its socio-cultural context, Cerulo thus nevertheless adopts a 
fourfold stage model as the appropriate device for classifying the cognitive sociological 
field.8 These stages are sensation and attention, discrimination and classification, 
representation and integration, and finally storage and retrieval. There is no doubt that it 
assists her in offering an orderly and informative overview of quite a vast range of 
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American and European contributions to cognitive social theory. Yet her framework is 
characterised by some conspicuous absences. That neither the interactionist tradition 
deriving from Cicourel (e.g. Saferstein in this issue) nor the naturalistic tradition (e.g. 
Turner in this issue) is accommodated – to mention only two American currents – points 
up its limitations. Decisive here is that Cerulo approaches classification ultimately from 
the point of view of culture. This leads her to ignore not only broader meta-theoretical 
dimensions, but also the fact that the structural division and operations of the brain could 
be regarded very differently. For instance, a modular view of the brain could be taken as 
the basis for a mechanistic approach to culture (e.g. Sperber 1996) instead. This suggests 
that a more comprehensive framework is possible.  
 
To advance beyond the above proposals one needs to take into account philosophically 
informed meta-theoretical dimensions which allow for distinctions at issue in the 
contemporary international debate. By observing the ontological, epistemological and 
methodological assumptions made by cognitive social theorists, it is possible to 
incorporate a much wider range of types and thus to achieve a more comprehensive 
mapping of the field. To develop an initial systematisation, I propose to construct a 
framework using criteria drawn from the contemporary debate about cognition which are 
tested against the philosophy of the social sciences. 
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Criteria for Mapping the Field 
 
Strong and weak cognitivism 
The first and most basic criterion I want to extrapolate is the distinction Sperber drew 
between cognitivisme fort and cognitivisme faible (1997: 125), strong and weak 
cognitivism. There is a sense in which this proposal coincides with Zerubavel’s (1997: 2-
3) distinction between ‘cognitive universalism’, the cognitive sciences’ concern with the 
universal foundations of cognition, and ‘cognitive individualism’, referring to a 
personalised view of the mind and hence individual idiosyncrasies. Strong cognitivism is 
represented by approaches which presuppose the priority of properties isolated by the 
cognitive sciences in the strict sense. They would include neurophysiological processes, 
neural or modular structures, neural events and thus cognitive mechanisms in the brain, 
but equally also informational or cognitive processes dealt with by cybernetics, artificial 
intelligence, biology and ethology as well as emergent cognitive structures such 
processes give rise to. Weak cognitivism, by contrast, applies to approaches that draw on 
the traditional stock of ideas of the social sciences rather than the natural sciences. 
Instead of the brain or brain-like structures and neural or informational processes, 
therefore, such approaches are concerned with beliefs, intentions, motives, meanings, 
reasons, rationality, mental representations, their formation and organization, their role in 
conduct and their function. 
 
The strong/weak distinction is a meaningful criterion for staking out the field and 
classifying cognitive social theory. 
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On the one extreme, Sperber’s (1997) own option is for the strong version which, in his 
case, goes back to Chomsky and Fodor and is thus closer to orthodox cognitivism. 
Although taking cues from connectionism as understood by Churchland rather than 
orthodox cognitivism, also Turner’s (2002, in this issue) proposal to conceive of social 
theory as cognitive neuroscience clearly falls in this category. While trying to avoid 
reductionism, he comes close to taking an eliminativist position which dismisses all 
versions of social theory based on traditional social scientific concepts such as a shared 
culture and practices. Luhmann’s (1990, 1992, 1995; see Leydesdorff in this issue, Eder 
in this issue, and Strydom 2006a) cognitive approach to system theory, which since the 
1980s has been inspired by cognitive biology and brain research, likewise belongs here. 
In these strong versions, the social dimension of cognition borne by physical or 
mechanical processes is the focus of attention. 
 
On the other extreme, the approaches of the French and German rational choice 
sociologists, Boudon (1995, 1997; see Bouvier in this issue) and Esser (1990, 1996; see 
Eder in this issue) respectively, are both examples of weak cognitivism. For both, 
concepts like intentions, meanings, reasons and rationality are central. Pharo (1998, in 
this issue), who characterises his central concern as moral sociology and his Weberian 
position as falling between phenomenology and cognitive science, also fits in here. While 
acknowledging the constraints of external reality and a certain degree of social 
construction of reality, he focuses specifically on subjective intentionality, reason and 
meaning in the form of cognitive structure and moral orientation as the intrinsic quality of 
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social action and social reality. By contrast with the cognitive objectivism of the strong 
cognitivists, then, Boudon, Esser and Pharo all represent some version or other of 
cognitive subjectivism. 
 
 
Supporting epistemological, ontological and methodological assumptions 
The distinction between two basic forms of cognitivism leads us back to the long 
historical sequence of disputes about the epistemological, ontological and methodological 
assumptions underpinning the social sciences (see e.g. Delanty and Strydom 2003) and 
the level of clarity attained in them regarding the relation between objectivism and 
subjectivism, naturalism and humanism, and explanation and understanding or 
observation and interpretation. Against this background, it becomes apparent that the 
emergence of cognitive science provided resources for the renewal of the claim of 
objectivist, naturalist and explanatory versus subjectivist, humanistic and interpretative 
approaches. In line with past disputes, so also in the contemporary debate, strong 
explanatory cognitivism is aligned with naturalism, while weaker forms of cognitive 
social science rather assume a humanistic ontology, thus leaning more or less towards the 
idealistic or rationalistic pole. 
 
Both Sperber (1985, 1996) and Turner (2002, in this issue) are emphatic about embracing 
a naturalist ontology inspired by neurophysiology. For a considerable period, they have 
been countering interpretative approaches by searching for explanatory principles in 
cognitive processes taking place in the brain. Whereas Turner locates these principles in 
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the workings of neurons, Sperber – starting from Fodor’s (1983) modular theory – finds 
them at the somewhat more general level of modules such as perception, attention, 
memory, language and so forth. Starting from Goffman’s naturalistic interactionism, but 
interpreting it more strongly under the impact of Dennett’s (1987) proposed cognitive 
ethology, Conein (1990, 2005) assimilates interpretation to an observational approach 
which allows a better understanding of human cognition and social relations by locating 
them against the comparative foil of the social dimension of primate cognition. In his 
hands, therefore, cognitive sociology is based on an ethological or, more specifically, a 
primatological model and is ascribed the task of explaining the generative mechanisms of 
group life. 
 
On the other hand, the Weberian sociologist Boudon (1995, 1997, 1998; see also Bouvier 
in this issue), representing a methodological individualist or solipsistic, rational choice 
cognitivism, is as adamant in rejecting naturalistic causal explanation – whether in terms 
of imitation, interiorisation, contagion, frames or some mechanical effect of social forces. 
Instead, he favours the reconstruction of the ideal-typical individual’s beliefs or actions in 
terms of plausible reasons. From his humanist perspective, cognitivism does not refer to 
natural mechanisms in the brain, but rather to the subjective rationality of conscious and 
intentional humans. Pharo (1998, in this issue), for his part, acknowledges that cognitive 
science compels the recognition of realism beyond pure constructivism and relativism. 
Yet he argues from a Weberian actionist and phenomenological perspective specifically 
against naturalism as represented by cognitive psychology and sociobiology, but also 
against Marxist historicism and Durkheimian sociologism. 
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Methodological individualism and infra-individualism 
Methodologically, yet another set of assumptions underpins the two forms of 
cognitivism. While the representatives of weak versions of cognitive social theory 
typically proceed from methodological individualist assumptions,9 a new concept was 
introduced in the 1990s which has begun to enliven the debate – viz. methodological 
‘infra-individualism’ (Sperber 1997; Bouvier 2002, in this issue). Sperber, who employs 
the phrase to characterise his own position, correlates infra-individualism with strong 
cognitivism and plays it off against weak cognitivism based on methodological 
individualism. 
 
Methodological individualism itself comes in two versions. The first weak version 
regards the individual as the basic unit of social structure in opposition to holism which 
prioritises institutional contexts or group concepts instead. The strong version treats the 
individual as a conscious subject and focuses on human actions and reasons in opposition 
not merely to holism but especially also to infra-individualism. An exemplary instance of 
this second type is Boudon’s (1995, 1997, 1998) cognitive rationalism. Infra-
individualism, by contrast, refers to productive processes in the organism below the level 
of the individual and therefore strips the actor or agent of all significance for the 
explication of social phenomena. If one accepts that there are several sub-levels of infra-
individualism, stretching from modules through neurons to genes, not to mention still 
more primitive levels, then it would seem as though Turner’s position (in this issue) 
could also be classified as infra-individualist. 
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Bouvier (in this issue) borrows methodological individualism from Boudon but extends it 
far beyond him so as to include an interactive or argumentative moment. He does not 
deny the relative right of supra- and infra-individual factors, not even of an ‘objective 
infra-individualism’ of natural or mechanical factors such as Sperber’s, yet insists that in 
a methodological individualist framework they must be traced back to the subjective 
dimension. 
 
Social cognition and distributed cognition 
An important distinction of relatively recent origin that is impacting on cognitive social 
theory by hardening into two distinct currents is one between social cognition and 
distributed cognition. Both focus on cognition in the sense of knowing and related 
processes dealing with information such as perception, attention, categorising, reasoning 
and planning, but they represent two distinct perspectives. 
 
Social cognition stems from classical psychology and has flourished since the cognitive 
revolution in various disciplines, especially psychology and ethology, within the 
framework of orthodox cognitivism (e.g. Howard 1994; Conein 2005). As such, it can be 
aligned with the strong, infra-individualist, explanatory cognitivist approach. Here 
cognition is regarded as a primary or basic, largely automatic process involving little or 
no reflection. Sociologically, Goffman’s (e.g. 1967) naturalistic approach to the 
elementary forms or generative mechanisms of sociation such as face-to-face interaction, 
mutual attention and joint action is in line with it. It is this tradition that Conein (1990, 
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2005) keeps alive in sociology today by grafting contemporary ideas deriving from 
cognitive psychology and cognitive primatology onto it. In anthropology, the same holds 
for Sperber’s (1996) modular epidemiological theory of the diffusion of cultural 
representations. 
 
Distributed cognition, on the other hand, was made possible by the shift from the 
computer model to the brain and environment, and is associated with connectionism 
which itself is subject to divergent interpretations. Besides Turner’s (2002, in this issue) 
proposal of a more orthodox, strong interpretation based on the paradigm of the brain 
according to which connectionism represents a habit model which best explains the tacit 
parts of culture, there is a further interpretation. It is inspired by a heterodox view of 
cognition which acknowledges the importance of taking account of the situatedness, 
activity and dynamics deriving from a relation to the environment (e.g. Clark 1998; 
Wertsch 1998). In its more developed versions, cognition is here taken as a complex 
secondary process in which reflection plays a significant role in mobilizing reasoning, 
diagnosis, planning, problem solving, cooperation and joint world creation. Rather than 
treating cognition simply as an aptitude, it is considered as a process in which collective 
knowledge is jointly produced and acquired in the plural in a particular context (e.g. 
Hutchins 1995). 
 
Such interpretation, however, takes us beyond the two extremes – beyond both strong and 
weak cognitivism, both objective and subjective cognitivism, both explanation and 
understanding and beyond both methodological individualist and infra-individualist 
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positions – towards an intermediate domain of positions which are able to mediate in 
some sense or other, or on a graded scale, between these polarised options.  
 
 
Intermediate positions 
In an intermediate position, but closer to the strong pole of the spectrum, are the German 
and Dutch authors Hejl and Leydesdorff. Hejl’s (1987, 1992, 1992a, 1993) conception of 
‘syn-referential’ social systems represents a less extreme form of cognitive social theory 
than Turner and Luhmann’s, yet it exhibits certain similarities with both. By contrast with 
Luhmann’s self-organizing, self-referential or autopoietic view, he regards social systems 
as including the agents who construct them and, in distinction to Turner, he stresses the 
central role of socially generated states or shared reality constructs in the living systems 
constituting social systems. Leydesdorff’s (in this issue) cognitive social system theory 
represents a still weaker version. While appreciating Luhmann’s contribution, he for his 
part decisively distances his own concern with social systems from Luhmann’s 
metabiological approach. Also in an intermediate position, but this time closer to the 
weak extreme of the continuum, is Bouvier (1995, 1997, 1998, 2002, in this issue). He 
explicitly argues that his ‘argumentativist’ version of cognitive sociology is not quite as 
weak as Sperber’s distinction would lead one to believe. It is indeed built on a 
methodological individualist basis, but is extended by an interactionist component which 
includes an economically conceived rhetorical model. Bouvier acknowledges the relative 
right of supra- and infra-individual factors, but grants that they transcend the limits even 
of his extended version of methodological individualism. 
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The question is what allows cognitive social scientists and theorists to override the 
distinction between strong and weak cognitivism and hence the effectively reproduced 
traditional methodological dualism. What allows for the possibility of intermediate 
positions? Here the notion of a relation of complementarity which raises the possibility of 
mediation between the two starkly opposed extremes is relevant. Recently, Engel (1997, 
1998) argued emphatically for complementarity in so far as, for instance, actionist 
rationalism is not necessarily incompatible with naturalism. Boudon et al. (1997: 8), in 
turn, interpret complementarity as suggesting an attempt to overcome a dualistic position 
as well as naturalistic reductionism, and see in it an intimation of what they call a 
‘troisième voie’. But one could ask whether a third way would not entail overcoming also 
actionist, individualist or rationalist one-sidedness. Surely, an idealistic ‘monism from 
below’ is as undesirable as a scientistic ‘monism from above’ (Habermas 2005: 170). 
Such considerations suggest the answer lies in cognitively relevant or interpreted 
axiomata media or specific rules of composition establishing determinate relations 
between the different dimensions involved.  
 
Substantively, in these terms, historically specific sets of societal, institutional, cultural 
and communicative conditions are assigned a significant role they do not enjoy in the 
strong and weak versions. For example, Cicourel (1973, 1990) and Saferstein (1998, in 
this issue) emphasise structures of interactive cooperation in specific institutional 
contexts. Social movement theorists like Snow et al. (1986, 1988), Eyerman and Jamison 
(1991) and Chazel (1997) analyse cognitive structures such as ‘frames’ or ‘cosmologies’ 
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generated by and guiding the interaction, cognitive praxis and collective action of 
movements. Starting from Habermas (1979, 1984/87, 1996), Miller (1986, 1992, 2002) 
and Eder (1993, 1996; in this issue) focus on structures of coordination generated in 
public discourses dealing with problems deriving from economic, political, social and 
cultural forces.10 Boltanski and Thévenot (1991; Thévenot 1998, 2001, in this issue) give 
attention to structures of coordination, modes of engagement with reality and 
corresponding cognitive formats in different contexts. For DiMaggio and Powell (1991; 
DiMaggio 1997) institutions which depend on the micro-level articulation of cognition 
and culture are central, while Zerubavel (1997), Cerulo (2002, 2005) and Brekhus (1998, 
in this issue) stress cultural structures as filters between mind and reality. The latter group 
of authors are emphatic that their approach occupies a ‘middle level’ (Zerubavel 1997: 5-
6) which focuses on ‘cognitive pluralism’ (Brekhus, in this issue) between ‘cognitive 
universalism’ and ‘cognitive individualism’.11 This gesture contains an important 
methodological indication. 
 
Weber’s complex methodological view of sociology faintly yet discernibly already 
suggested that mediation between complementary positions is possible, and this was 
borne out by the third phase of the explanation-understanding controversy (Delanty and 
Strydom 2003). In contemporary cognitive social science, for instance, D’Andrade 
(1995) and DiMaggio (1997, 2002) advocate building cognitive assumptions deriving 
from cognitive psychology and social cognition explicitly into anthropological and 
sociological studies of culture. Very importantly, the strategic sense of this is to relativise 
the symbolic dimension in relation to the cognitive dimension yet without jettisoning the 
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former. Although himself holding to a relatively strong cognitivism, Conein (2005: 179) 
raises the possibility of mediation in the guise of a pluralistic approach which seeks to 
render naturalism and interpretativism ‘compatible’, while avoiding ‘reductionist 
naturalism’, ‘social naturalism’ or sociologism, culturalism and actionist rationalism. 
 
Recently, Habermas made a comparable proposal. He outlined a non-scientistic ‘weak’ 
(2003: 22) or ‘soft naturalism’ (2005: 215) which sees continuity between nature and the 
sociocultural world, but does not allow the ontological priority of the former to snuff out 
the epistemological priority of the latter.12 Through the solution of evolutionary 
problems, natural historical processes give rise to ‘naturally formed structures’ 
possessing ‘cognitive import’; in turn, these structures make it possible for humans living 
in socio-cultural worlds to ‘have experiences of and make statements about…the 
objective world’, to ‘learn’, ‘develop knowledge’ and pursue in a ‘constructivist’ manner 
the realisation of a ‘social world’ which ‘cannot become real without the assistance of 
morally acting subjects’ (Habermas 2003: 10-49). Eder’s (1988, 1993, 1996, in this issue) 
cognitive sociology ultimately also presupposes such a weak or soft naturalism.13 He 
acknowledges the evolutionary process and sociality in non-human populations, but 
stresses the specificity of human sociality, social construction and processes of learning 
and social evolution thus set in motion. 
 
Looking back from a contemporary vantage point, it is obvious that of the classical 
cognitive sociologists, Goffman’s work most decisively occupies an intermediate 
position. Considering his wide-ranging impact on later developments, he must surely 
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count as the most central and influential figure in cognitive sociology. One line links up 
with and extends Goffman’s concern with ‘primary frameworks’, ‘schemata of 
interpretation’ or ‘frames,’ but gives it a cultural interpretation. Zerubavel, having studied 
with Goffman, for example pursues work on ‘social mindscapes’ (1999), while Snow and 
associates (1986, 1988) apply his concept of frame to social movements. Another – 
naturalist rather than culturalist – line of development represented by Conein (1990, 
2005) takes seriously Goffman’s concern with mind and activity being ‘in the real world’ 
(1986: 247). The assumption here is ‘that although natural events occur without 
intelligent intervention, intelligent doings cannot be accomplished effectively without 
entrance into the natural order’, which implies that ‘any segment of a socially guided 
doing can be partly analyzed within a natural schema’ (1986: 23). Thirdly,  Eder’s (in this 
issue, 1996) communicative-discursive approach not only builds on a transformation of 
Goffman’s concept of ‘interaction order’, but also makes central theoretical and 
methodological use of his frame concept.  
 
Types of Contemporary Social Theory 
Against the background of the overall evolution of the field, the above survey has 
brought forward a number of criteria for the construction of a framework by means of 
which one could begin to map and thus systematise the diversity of positions in 
contemporary cognitive social theory. The first tentative attempt to do so is presented in 
the diagram below. The names of the eight authors representing exemplary positions in 
this issue are in bold and for the sake of comparison are located in relation to some of the 
other authors mentioned in the course of the discussion. 
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Contemporary Cognitive Social Theory: Assumptions and Positions 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Metatheory  Theory    Theorist 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Strong cognitivist/ Neur(on)al   Stephen Turner 
Strong naturalistic Modular epidemiological  Dan Sperber 
   Autopoietic system  Niklas Luhmann 
   Naturalistic interactionist Bernard Conein 
________________________________________________________________________ 
   |       ▲   Syn-referential system Peter Hejl 
   |                           | Cognitive social system Loet Leydesdorff 
   |         | Pragmatic communication- Habermasian cognitive sociology: 
   |         | discourse   Max Miller, Klaus Eder14
   |      axiomata       | Neo-institutional  Paul DiMaggio 
   | media        | Mindscape   Eviatar Zerubavel, Karen Cerulo, 
   |         |     Wayne Brekhus    
   |         | Pragmatic sociological  Luc Boltanksi & Laurent Thévenot 
   |         | Frame alignment  David Snow et al., François Chazel 
   |                | Social movement  Ron Eyerman & Andrew Jamison 
   |         | Interactionist   Aaron Cicourel, Barry Saferstein 
  ▼         | Argumentativist MI/RAT Alban Bouvier 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Strong humanistic/ Moral sociological   Patrick Pharo 
Weak cognitivist Rational choice  Raymond Boudon 
   Rational choice  Hartmut Esser 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
While no claim to comprehensivity and full systematicity is attached to it, this 
classification isolates an important structural dimension of the field. By bringing together 
and interrelating relatively independent developments, it affords a view of the overall 
contours as well as of alternative pathways crisscrossing the landscape. Thereby it not 
simply offers a sense of the growth, range, diversity and richness already attained, but 
also highlights the structural problem opened up by the cognitive movement. A map of 
this kind is both meaningful and useful in various respects. It enables one to grasp the 
research agenda emerging in the field and to locate oneself in relation to a range of other 
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directions. It thus not only puts one in a propitious position to understand and develop 
one’s own approach better, but also indicates how the cognitive approach is filling out a 
neglected but indispensable dimension of social theory as a multi-dimensional enterprise. 
Judging from the past decade, we can expect the impact of this theoretical turn on social 
theory to intensify significantly in the next number of years. 
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Notes 
 
1 My thanks are due to a number of people without whose advice, support and 
cooperation this special issue would have been impossible: the editor of this journal, 
Gerard Delanty, each of the contributors, and the referees. At an early stage of this 
project, Dan Sperber, Laurent Thévenot, Stephen Turner and Eviatar Zerubavel offered 
me valuable advice and/or support. My debt to Klaus Eder goes back many years. This 
special issue benefited also from a research grant under the third cycle of the Irish Higher 
Education Authority’s Programme for Research in Third Level Institutions. 
2 E.g. Piaget (1932, 1974): cognitive development; Miller et al. (1960): cognitive 
mechanisms of plan execution. 
3 E.g. Minsky (1975): frames; Winograd and Flores (1986): environment. 
4 E.g. Chomsky (1965): generative transformational grammar and linguistic competence; 
Searle (1969): intentionality and speech acts. 
5 An example of the first is the conflict between Habermas (1984/87) conceiving 
communication in terms of intersubjectivity and Luhmann (1995) in terms of 
connectivity. The second is exhibited by Goffman’s (1974) failure to give a coherent 
account of the naturalistic and interactionist moments in his approach, or Habermas’ 
(1979) maintenance of a tension-laden relation between a cognitive psychological and a 
pragmatic cognitive model for theorising the process of the constitution of society. 
Goffman is criticised by Conein (1990: 315) and Boudon (1995: 87, 1997: 20), and 
Habermas by Miller (1986), Eder (1988, 2000) and Strydom (1987, 1992, 2001, 2006b). 
6 E.g. Geertz (1973), Laudan (1977), Collins (1981), Alexander (1987), Fuller (1984, 
2000) and lately Hałas (2002). 
7 The modest and tentative nature of the present proposal to map the field becomes clear, 
for instance, in the light of the exacting demands of the social studies of science or of 
science, technology and society studies (e.g. Cozzens 1997). Another option not followed 
here either is to approach contemporary cognitive social theory, in Bourdieu’s terms, as 
the field of contestation it undoubtedly is. For the parameters of my own research 
programme, see Strydom (2000). 
8 Zerubavel adopts a similar approach in his cognitive sociological primer, Social 
Mindscapes (1997). 
9 For the older debate on methodological individualism, see O’Neill (1973). 
10 See also Strydom (2000, 2002) as well as Delanty (2001) and Delanty and Rumford 
(2005). 
11 It is remarkable that Zerubavel acknowledges the need for ‘an integrative 
approach…[in the sense of]…a truly comprehensive science of the mind’, yet he does not 
raise the possibility that the cognitive sociological field itself has to be conceived as 
embracing all these dimensions rather than just the middle one. 
12 For Habermas, the current debate generated by cognitive science is about ‘the correct 
way in which to naturalise the mind’ (2005: 156, his emphasis, my translation). 
13 In Strydom (2002) I defend and develop this position which, in my judgement, opens 
more relevant and thus potentially more fruitful possibilities for the attempt to analyse 
socio-historical processes and events than either a strong or a weak cognitivist stance. 
Published in European Journal of Social Theory 10(3), 2007, pp. 339-356 (Special issue 
on ‘Social Theory after the Cognitive Revolution: Types of Contemporary Cognitive 
Sociology’, Guest editor: Piet Strydom). 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
14 My own analyses (Strydom 2000, 2002) are directly related to this line of development. 
See also Delanty (2001) and Delanty and Rumford (2005). 
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